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Most central banks in Europe and elsewhere have been giving
priority to the achievement of price stability for more than a decade. ~ In
recent years, this effort has been reinforced by a marked trend toward
giving central banks much more autonomy to pursue this goal. Both the
objective of achieving price stability and such autonomy have, in a
sizable number of countries, now been constitutionally incorporated in
newly revised legislation. In countries where no such legislation has
been enacted, such as the United Kingdom and Australia, proposals to
do so remain very much on the present political agenda.2
Such legislative moves towards greater autonomy ("indepen-
dence") have been so widespread and rapid that it’ app’ears worthwhile
to try to document the present position. This paper will concentrate
mostly on developments in Europe, since this is the region with which
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1 See Appendix Table I at the end of this paper for a report on the current institutional
features of central banks in the European Union. The Annual Report of the Committee of
Governors of European Central Banks (1993) contains a detailed comparison of the
institutional features of the central banks of the European Union.
2 In the United Kingdom, proposals to introduce legislation for central bank indepen-
dence were advocated in the Roll Committee Report (1993) and in the House of Commons
Select Committee Report (1993); a private member’s bill to that effect was introduced by
Mr. N. Budgen in February 1994, but the government prevented it from becoming law. In
Australia such independence for the Reserve Bank was part of the electoral program of the
Liberal Party at the 1992 election, but this measure was not supported by the victorious
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the authors are most familiar, but it will also refer to similar progress in
the Antipodes and Canada. The same trend toward the enactment of
legislation for greater central bank autonomy is also evident in a number
of South American countries, such as Chile and Mexico.
The move toward granting greater central bank autonomy reflects
to some considerable extent the power of academic ideas whose time has
come. The time inconsistency hypothesis posits that governments with
a high rate of time discount, particularly as elections approach,3 and a
natural concern about unemployment, are likely to have a bias towards
generating a stable, expected rate of inflation, without any beneficial
effect on real equilibrium (that is, medium- and longer-term) values. The
implication is that more politically subservient central banks will have
less credibility, and that in such countries average inflation will be
higher. Such theoretical hypotheses have received some empirical
support from studies of the correlations between central bank indepen-
dence and both inflation (negative) and output (zero) (Alesina and
Summers 1993; Cukierman 1992; see Posen 1993 for a critique). All this
has spawned a large literature, with which it is assumed the reader is
familiar, so this is not pursued further. The subject is also discussed in
the paper in this volume by Debelle and Fischer.
Perhaps the most successful and probably the most admired central
bank in Europe is the Deutsche Bundesbank. The Bundesbank has acted
as role model for other aspiring European banks and has acted as the
leader and contra-inflationary anchor in the Exchange Rate Mechanism
of the European Monetary System. Even without academic analytical
support for autonomous central banks, it is quite possible that the
prospective European System of Central Banks, whose Protocols were
established in the Maastricht Treaty, would have had its constitutional
independence from government modeled on that of the Bundesbank in
any case. Moreover, if the European System of Central Banks is to be
thus independent, consistency and logic require that the member
national central banks of the System should adopt the same constitu-
tional structure. So, as will be discussed in more detail below, in
Western Europe the prospective advent of economic and monetary
union has provided another impulse toward the revision of central bank
legislation in the direction of a stronger and more explicit mandate
toward price stability, and greater autonomy and independence from
government in the operation of monetary policy to that end. In Eastern
Europe the expected date of accession to the European Union, and to
3 The suggestion that governments would positively seek, and central banks acqui-
esce in, a conscious expansion in monetary growth, for example, prior to elections, is
unduly cynical. Instead, the focus of political pressure will usually be to defer upward
increases in interest rates, or to accelerate their downward movements, to some extent at
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economic and monetary union within it, is rather more distant, but the
processes of economic reform that have followed the collapse of Com-
munism provide both an occasion and a need for updating and revising
their central bank legislation (Hochreiter 1994). Again, all this is as-
sumed to be common knowledge.
The rest of this paper will concentrate on the way in which the
strategy and tactics of monetary policy are now being articulated in this
context. The next section documents the common adoption of price
stability as the overriding priority. This does not, however, prevent the
adoption of subsidiary objectives. While price stability has now been
generally accepted as the dominant objective for central banks’ mone-
tary policy, the term "’price stability" most often has not been defined,
either legislatively or in practice. Some possible alternative definitions
will be discussed along with the pros and cons of adopting them,
including the choice of index and whether the objective should be
expressed in terms of a price level or a specific rate of inflation (for
example, zero).
Having thus discussed how the primary objective, price stability,
may be defined, the paper then reviews certain strategic decisions about
how to set about achieving this. Should there be a quantified, numerical
target for price stability? If so, who should set it, the government alone,
the central bank alone, or the two in conjunction? Should the govern-
ment have the ability, unilaterally, to override that prior decision and, if
so, through what processes? How long should the target period be?
Should there be a point target or a band and, if the latter, how wide?
Will a numerical target unduly constrain the ability of the central bank to
react to unforeseen demand or supply shocks? What incentives are
there, or should there be, for a central bank to achieve its announced
targets? More broadly, what arrangements have been established to
make an "independent" central bank accountable within the context of
a democratic society?
Three main concerns are frequently expressed about the current
penchant for mandating independent central banks to have overriding
concern for the single objective of price stability. First, is this focus and
mandate too narrow? Second, is the delegation of such powers to an
’independent’ agent consistent with the obligations of government in a
democratic society (another facet of the accountability question)? Third,
is the transfer of power over monetary policy to a separate body
consistent with the optimal coordination of macro-policy instruments,
comprising fiscal policy, trade policy, exchange rate policy, and even
incomes policy, as well as monetary policy?
The discussion then turns to tactical and operational issues. In
particular, should a central bank use intermediate targets in its pursuit
of price stability, whether or not the latter objective has also been
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adoption? In practice, monetary aggregates and exchange rates have
been the two main alternatives. The relative advantages and disadvan-
tages of both are discussed, as well as the operational difficulties of
working either with intermediate targets or with none at all (that is,
using monetary instruments directly for the achievement of the final
objective of price stability).
The paper goes on to consider certain tactical and operational
reforms and adjustments that will be required in the European Union in
order to prepare for the advent of a single monetary policy, which will
be carried out by the prospective European System of Central Banks
within the economic and monetary union. While such reforms are,
perhaps, not strictly a necessary adjunct of the move to central bank
independence and enhanced autonomy as such, this latter step within
Europe is going hand in hand with preparation for economic and
monetary union. In particular, the paper reviews prospective changes in
the form of money market operations and assesses the likely role of
reserve ratios in the context of economic and monetary union.
Price Stability: The Overriding
Objective for Central Banks
Since 1989, a large number of revisions have been made to central
bank legislation (Table 1). Such revisions in most cases place price
stability as the primary objective of monetary policy; indeed, having the
opportunity to specify that requirement in legislation often was one of
the main reasons for its enactment in the first place. This emphasis on
price stability contrasts with earlier practice. Only in a few cases, such as
the Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank, was such legislative
emphasis previously placed on price stability. In many cases multiple
economic objectives were set down, and in others no explicit objectives
were set. In the case of the Bank of England, for example, the Act did
not mention what its economic objectives should be at all, a lacuna that
Governor Towers at the time pointed out might represent a weakness
for the Bank in arguing policy issues with the government, as turned out
to be the case (Fforde 1992).
Given this emphasis on price stability as the overriding, primary, or
in some cases sole objective of monetary policy, as laid down in (most)
recent legislation, it is perhaps remarkable that only in a few cases (New
Zealand and Canada, and the 1993 Swedish White Paper) is any
definition given of what might be meant by that central concept. If the
objective is not clearly defined, then it could be argued that it is more
difficult to assess how well, or badly, the central bank is doing in
achieving its objective. Moreover, many possible definitions of price
stability exist, and some complex and fine technical issues are involved,STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF MONETARY POLICY 143
Table 1
Recent Central Bank Legislation: Actual or Prospective
Numerical target Increase in Increase in
Date of          Objective Primary        set for price institutional operational
Country Legislation Revised? Objective objective? autonomy? autonomy?
France December 1993 Yes Price stability No Yes Yes
Spain June 1994 Yes Price stability No Yes










United Roll Report, (Roll) (Roll) Price Retail Price (Roll) Yes:
Kingdom 1993--Select Yes stability Index though





Sweden Act of 1989 and (W.P.) (W.P.) Price Consumer Prices (W.P.) Yes (W.P.) Yes
1993 White Paper Yes stability 2% + 1% for
proposals (W. P.) 1995
New Zealand 1989 Yes Price stability Retail Price Yes: Yes
Index though
(0 to 2%) slight






Mexico November 1993 Yes Price stability -- Yes Yes
Czech December 1992 Yes Stability of the -- Yes Yes
Republic currency





Source: Central bank laws, present official proposals, U.K, Roll Report and Swedish White Paper.
for example, in deciding what index to use. So the question of definition
has considerable substance, yet has been largely ducked. Nevertheless,
though it has not been quantitatively defined, most central bankers
reckon that they can tell qualitatively when such stability holds, and they
frequently quote Alan Greenspan’s well-known definition with ap-
proval and affirmation.
The Focus on Price Stability
At present, in only a few cases (for example, New Zealand and a
proposal for the United Kingdom by the 1993 Roll Report) is the
achievement of price stability (or some synonym) set out in central bank144 Charles A.E. Goodhart and Josd Vi~ials
legislation to be the sole macroeconomic objective for monetary policy.
Usually the requirement is taken to be primary, or overriding, in the
lexicographic sense that only when this objective is achieved can the
central bank turn to its secondary objective(s). Most recent revisions of
national central bank acts in Europe, and the Protocol of the European
System of Central Banks, express this latter objective in a rather general
fashion, "’to support" and carry out its "duties within the framework of
the government’s overall economic policy." Since the requirement to
support the overall economic policy of the current government might,
taken by itself, be held to make the central bank subservient, the precise
terms of the conditionality whereby price stability must have first
priority, and be achieved before this secondary objective can be at-
tempted, become important. The relevant clause in Article 105 (1) of the
Maastricht Treaty and in the Protocol for the European System Central
Banks and member national central banks (Article 2) reads as follows:
Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, it shall support the
general economic policies in the Community...
Besides their macro-objective of maintaining price stability, histor-
ically central banks also have, to some varying extent, assumed or been
made responsible for the systemic stability and the successful workings
of some central parts of the financial system, such as the payments
system and the commercial banks that operate that system. While in
some countries it is arguable that these micro-level objectives had
historical and functional priority relative to the macro-level objective of
maintaining price stability, in other countries supervisory powers over
banks (and payments systems) are divided bePween the central bank
and a separate agency for bank supervision, or even concentrated in the
latter. The general question of whether such a split of responsibilities
was beneficial or not has recently received much attention in the
literature (see Bruni 1993, especially the paper by Goodhart and Schoen-
maker; Chiappori and others 1991; and Folkerts-Laudau and Garber
1992). The division of views is reflected in the fact that, as shown in
Appendix Table 1, three of the central banks do not have specific
responsibility for the supervision of financial institutions, whereas nine
do have such a responsibility.
The shift from the view that monetary policy was but one facet of
general demand management whose objectives included real as well as
nominal variables, to the view that monetary policy should have a single
focus, to achieve price stability, has been quite remarkably widespread
and rapid. It is perhaps not surprising that this change in viewpoint has
been seized on quite enthusiastically by central bankers. A multiplicity
of objectives implies trade-offs and choices that must be inherently
political, while a single focus, or unambiguous bottom line, facilitatesSTRATEGY AND TACTICS OF MONETARY POLICY 145
central banks becoming independent, but accountable, agents of gov-
ernment.
But the ideas involved have also been quite widely accepted by
governments and political parties of all tendencies. Right-wing parties
tend to approve of the concept of an independent central bank in
principle, particularly when the alternative is a central bank subservient
to an opposition left-wing government. Left-wing parties are less keen
on the concept itself, but recognize that the credibility gain in financial
markets is important (more so than for right-wing parties). Accordingly,
the most favorable condition for enacting central bank independence is
when this is proposed by a left-wing government and supported by a
right-wing opposition, as in New Zealand and Spain. Perhaps the most
telling example is South Africa, where the African National Congress
were keen to incorporate central bank independence in the interim
constitution. Right-wing politicians in opposition tend to support cen-
tral bank independence but often become less keen on the idea when in
office, as in the case of Mrs. Thatcher in the United Kingdom.
A Variety of Objections
Much of the intellectual, academic basis for the case for an inde-
pendent central bank has come from economists, building on the
concepts of a vertical long-run Phillips curve, rational expectations, and
time inconsistency. Yet a sizable fraction of economists, especially
various brands of neo- or post-Keynesians, remain unhappy and un-
convinced about such analytical concepts. Trying to provide an empir-
ical fix for the NAIRU is often a very difficult task (see C6t~ and
Hostland 1994 for Canada). Post-Keynesians, and others, would deny
either the possibility or the practical relevance of rational expectations.
The suggested behavior of governments, according to the time incon-
sistency argument, has only some rather limited empirical backing
(Alesina 1989). Consequently, proposals for mandating central banks to
focus solely on price stability have run into some opposition from
economists, as was, for example, evidenced in Canada (Canadian
Standing Committee on Finance 1992) and discussed in the subsequent
Charlottetown Canadian Economic Association Meeting (Crow 1992).
Nevertheless, on the basis of casual empiricism, relatively little
opposition has been raised to this general shift to a focus on price
stability alone. One alternative frequently canvassed in the economic
literature has been to target nominal incomes rather than price stability
(see, for example, Hall and Mankiw 1993). This has several possible
advantages. It gives some weight to deviations of output from its trend,
though as Hall (1986) pointed out, the (one-to-one) weighting is arbi-
trary, rather than based on considerations of welfare maximization.
Moreover, as Duguay notes (1994, p. 22):146 Charles A.E. Goodhart and ]os~ Vifials
There is an extensive pre-Keynesian literature arguing in effect that stabili-
zation of nominal income would be preferred to price stability (Selgin 1990).
That literature emphasized the two arguments of equity and efficiency. It
pointed out that the transfer of resources between lenders and borrowers or
between retired and active workers that is associated with cushioning supply
shocks with price level shifts has the effect of spreading the shock more
equally across individuals, A price level norm, in contrast, would shelter
lenders and retired workers from adverse supply shocks, thus increasing the
burden borne by debtors and active workers; it would also deny the former
the benefits of favorable supply shocks. The efficiency argument stressed the
short-run disruptions in economic activity associated with the nominal
disturbance involved in maintaining a stable price level.
Nominal spending targets have been studied extensively in the last 10 to
15 years. Studies have shown that their adoption could have led to a
considerable reduction in the variances of output and inflation from historical
values; they have also consistently fared very well relative to other nominal
anchors in terms of weighted average of the variances of output and inflation.
Despite these arguments for an objective defined in terms of
nominal incomes rather than price stability alone, the revealed prefer-
ence of most central bankers and legislators has been to specify a target
purely in terms of price stability. Possibly these factors are among the
considerations involved: (i) the difficulty of estimating potential trend
output, and hence of deviations from that; (ii) the problems caused by
the delays in, and revisions to, data on GDP and its real and deflator
components; and (iii) the desire to emphasize that monetary policy and
central banks are, or should be, responsible solely for nominal price
variables, and not for real variables. Nevertheless, in the short run, in
which contracts are fixed and expectations set, monetary policy actions
do have real consequences. How far does this focus on price stability
complicate and limit the short-run response of central banks to shocks of
various kinds?
An argument often advanced in these instances is that some price
level changes may occur whose first-round effect the central banks may
want to absorb rather than reverse, for example, those caused by supply
shocks of uncertain duration such as oil shocks. However, several of
those countries with quantified numerical targets for retail and con-
sumer price indices have escape clauses in the small print allowing them
to disregard certain (supply) shocks such as oil/energy/food/terms-of-
trade shocks (Canada and New Zealand), indirect taxes, and the direct
effects on the price index of interest changes themselves. In the United
Kingdom, a variety of price indices have been developed, such as RPIX
and RPIY, which by construction exclude those items most subject to
supply shocks. Thus, through qualifying clauses in the small print, the
countries with numerical targets will usually escape any self-imposed
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round effect of large, specific adverse supply shocks. The possibility of
adverse supply shocks affecting raw materials, oil, wheat, and the like is
generally acknowledged, while the likelihood of severe adverse supply
shocks to productivity in the secondary and tertiary sectors of the
economy remains more contentious.
In addition, the relatively long time horizons of the inflation targets
so far established give some leeway for the central banks involved to
adjust their response to unforeseen supply shocks in the early years of
the target period. Important issues remain: whether these factors, the
small print in the contract and the long horizon, give too little or too
much room to adjust to unforeseen supply shocks, and what might be
the expected probability, size, and form of the shocks. We all know
about oil shocks and harvest failures (and can guard against them in
devising the precise form of the rule/target), but what form might
adverse supply shocks take in the manufacturing or services sector?
Simply specifying that there is an error term, a stochastic variable, in the
aggregate supply function is not much practical use to central bankers.
Perhaps of more immediate concern, both to central banks and to
politicians, is the question of coordination between policies; specifically,
between the operation of monetary policy, increasingly to be delegated
to autonomous central banks, and the conduct of exchange rate and
fiscal policies. The political authorities have almost invariably, and
certainly so in the European Union (Article 109 of the Maastricht Treaty),
kept responsibility for strategic decisions about the exchange rate regime
in their own hands, although tactical operations are usually delegated to
the central banks (Appendix Table 1). The potential inconsistency of
requiring that the central bank both achieve domestic price stability and
also adhere to a fixed exchange rate is, however, widely understood.
What is less clear is how far the central bank from the anchor country in
a pegged exchange rate system, for example the Bundesbank, or the
various central banks in a system of fuzzy exchange rate target bands (such
as the G3 under Louvre), should adjust their open market operations or
interest rates for external, as contrasted with domestic, objectives.
It remains a matter of both theoretical interest and practical concern
whether central banks can achieve domestic price stability (even if
granted complete independence from political control and autonomy
over interest rate setting), should the government exhibit fiscal irrespon-
sibilityr Even so, the constitutional shift to central bank autonomy must
be presumed to reduce somewhat the likelihood of such fiscal irrespon-
sibility, because it would be more surely and quickly penalized by
offsetting interest rate increases, thereby reducing the political tempta-
tion. If this is so, then while central bank independence may not be
sufficient for price stability, given an irresponsible government, it must
be a move in the right direction.148 Charles A.E. Goodhart and Josd Vi~ials
Strategy for Achieving Price Stability
Given this concentration on "price stability," it is somewhat sur-
prising that this term is rarely defined, at least in the relevant Acts (Table
1). In practice, however, central banks appear to have a clearly revealed
preference for the form of target for price stability that they adopt. In
most cases where a numerical target has been set, whether jointly or
unilaterally by government or central bank, this has been defined in
terms of a band for the rate of inflation of the retail or consumer price
index: for instance, the 1 to 3 percent objective for the CPI agreed
between the government and the Bank of Canada and reaffirmed in 1994
for the period 1995~-98 (see Freedman 1994); the 0 to 2 percent target for
the RPI in New Zealand agreed between the government and the
Reserve Bank, now extending to 1996; and the 1 to 4 percent target for
the RPI in the United Kingdom set unilaterally by the government over
the period till 1997.
In Continental Europe, however, the Exchange Rate Mechanism
since its creation in 1979 has provided the main framework for the
pursuit of price stability. Also, the central bank in charge of the anchor
currency of the system, the Deutsche Bundesbank, has had a satisfac-
tory experience with intermediate monetary targets, at least until very
recently, sticking with these while they were being progressively
abandoned or downgraded elsewhere. Consequently there has been
little experience on the Continent with specific numerical targets for
inflation, apart from Sweden in the 1930s and now prospectively since
1993 (Persson and Tabellini 1994). Thus, most of this section discusses
issues, lessons, and questions arising from the experience of Canada,
New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, countries that have adopted
differing forms of such quantified inflation objectives.
Level or Rate of Change?
This revealed choice raises questions about why the target was set
in terms of rates of change, rather than the price level; the use, and
width, of bands rather than points; the choice of index; the horizon; and
the identity of the target setter, government, and/or central bank. The
first question, whether to set a target for rates of change rather than for
levels, was probably largely decided in terms of the initial context of
continuing, though falling, inflation. The objective of achieving a given
price level during the transition toward obtaining virtually zero inflation
just seemed too daunting and deflationary. Several recent papers
(Lebow, Roberts, and Stockton 1992; Scarth 1994; Fillion and Tetlow
1994; Duguay 1994) present academic arguments for preferring a target
in terms of levels rather than rates of change, as an equilibrium
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reached. Since bygones are bygones under the latter, the longer-term
variance, and hence uncertainty, about prices is greater. The expectation
that an unforeseen price change shock will be reversed in due course,
once credibility in the regime of price level stability has been attained,
would make the system more self-stabilizing.
Apart from the decisive argument about one step at a time in
transition, arguments against moving to a constant price level target
include the belief/argument that a small, but positive, bias exists in
estimates of price inflation, perhaps some 0.5 to 0.6 percent per year,
owing, for example, to systematic improvements in goods’ quality
(Crawford 1993; Hershey 1994). It is also argued that it may be better to
err on the side of a small positive inflation, rather than an equally small
deflation. This may be because of some extra rigidity over reducing
nominal wages, or because the zero lower bound to nominal interest
rates makes it more difficult to lower real interest rates at zero, or
negative, inflation rates (see Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher 1994;
Crawford and Dupasquier 1994). None of these arguments, however,
really provides a good case for preferring inflation to price level targets,
since the latter could be set in terms of a constant positive upward trend
(with bands, perhaps) to take account of any argument about bias,
lubricant, and the like.
Band Width?
As already noted, the inflation target is expressed in terms of a
band, typically of a 2 or 3 percent width. This is small relative to the
historical standard deviation of inflation in most countries, and it
implies that targets could quite often be missed despite the central
bank’s commitment and best efforts. Of course, a disadvantage of a
point target is that it is virtually certain to be missed, and the finer
details of the extent of that miss may not be readily communicable to the
wider public. Whether by luck or good management, numerical targets
in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Canada have so far been
met; it may be that changing the constitutional regime for monetary
policy may also change the performance of the system. Be that as it may,
the selection of band width involves a trade-off between the credibility-
enhancing effects of choosing a quite demanding target and the credi-
bility-damaging effects of failing to adhere to it.
Horizon
Monetary policy, in the guise of changes in interest rates, first
affects financial variables and asset prices, then after a short lag financial
flows, and next, output; finally it impinges on generalized current goods
and services inflation, with this last link involving long and variable150 Charles A.E. Goodhart and ]osd Vi~ials
lags, perhaps some six to eight quarters. Given such lags, a numerical
target for price inflation, relevant to current monetary policy, has to be
set some two years or more into the future. This has been the case in the
United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Canada, with the additional twist
that the target has been revised (extended in time, but not to date raised)
by a newly elected government, in New Zealand with the election of the
National Party in 1991 and in Canada with the election of the Liberals in
1993. Again, there is a trade-off between not having the target so close
that monetary policy hardly has time, given the lags, to affect prices, and
not having the target so far ahead that it ceases to seem immediately
relevant to decision-makers. And again, the consensus seems to be that
the minimum initial horizon should be at least two years, and the
maximum some four or five years hence.
Given the lags involved, the central bank will need to know what its
next target will be before the first expires. So a successor target needs to
be set for the subsequent period at least a year before the first is
completed. Nevertheless, the old target need not be dropped altogether,
once the next target is set. It is desirable, in order to maintain account-
ability, that a central bank’s success, or otherwise, be assessed regularly
in terms of the outcome against the completed, full target objective. The
relatively long length of the target period allows the central bank some
flexibility to respond to unforeseen shocks in the early years, but the
need to meet the final deadline target becomes increasingly constraining
over time. Remember, however, that the small print in many cases
allows central banks to avoid having to offset the direct effect of major
adverse supply shocks (beneficial supply shocks being an uncovenanted
benefit), while unforeseen demand shocks should be offset. Some of those
who criticize this policy approach of giving overriding priority to price
stability do so because they believe that it both results in unduly
deflationary policy and prevents the central bank from responding to
(downward) deviations of output from trend. Neither extending the
target horizon nor rolling the target forward each year (so it is never
completed) would much assuage their concerns, however, while it
would potentially weaken the credibility and commitment of the central
bank to beat inflation.
Which Index?
One of the technically more complex questions is which price index
to use. Revealed preference to date indicates that this will be the RPI or
CPI, both widely used and understood, promptly calculated, and rarely
revised. On all these counts either is preferred to the GDP deflator.
Nevertheless, concern with supply shocks, most likely to emerge in food
and energy prices, and with indirect taxes and the effects on the index
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payments on housing), have led to a variety of alternative versions of
the RPI being deployed (see the Bank of England "Inflation Report").
One concern, raised by Alchian and Klein (1973) and taken on by
Shibuya (1992), Shigehara (1990), Schinasi and Hargraves (1994) and
Goodhart (1993), is that the RPI/CPI covers only prices of the current
flow of goods and services; it excludes any coverage of present changes
in the prices of future goods and services. When housing and property
prices, for example, went through their recent cycle of boom and bust,
should not central banks have taken such asset price movement into
account in their assessment of the underlying rate of inflation? At the
Bank of Japan Conference (October 1993) when this subject was dis-
cussed, the consensus was that central banks should take asset price
movements into account, but in a discretionary, qualitative manner, if
only because asset prices tended to be more flexible than, and hence to
lead, wages and prices of goods and services. But little support was
voiced in that discussion for formally incorporating asset prices into an
extended price index, in some cases because of theoretical objections,
but more generally because such asset prices were so volatile and noisy,
being subject to sharp shifts in tastes and preferences.
Who Sets the Target?
An important constitutional issue is who should be responsible for
setting any quantified numerical target. For the government to do so
unilaterally, as occurs currently in the United Kingdom, underscores the
dependent position of the central bank and would, therefore, be
inconsistent with a preference for a more autonomous and independent
bank. But some well-balanced arguments have been presented both for
having the numerical target jointly agreed, as in New Zealand and
Canada, and for allocating that responsibility to the central bank alone.
It was one of the key subjects of discussion in the Roll Committee Report
in the United Kingdom, which finally came down in favor of having the
central bank set its own targets unilaterally, largely on the grounds of
the potential time inconsistency of politicians; thus, the Report states
(1993, p. 32):
[W]e believe that UK monetary policy needs greater independence than can
be achieved through any system in which ministers have operational respon-
sibility for framing targets. Our design attempts to achieve this by assigning
ultimate responsibility for choice of targets to the Bank alone (though of
course it would discuss, and normally agree, those with ministers), and by
leaning as heavily as we can on transparency in two ways. First, although the
government and Bank could announce that they believed different target
ranges for inflation appropriate at any particular time, itself a signal likely to
place government policy under close public scrutiny, the only recourse to a
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suspending the Bank’s sole objective; the Bank could not be undermined
simply by the government’s persistent challenge of its target settings.
In response it may be argued that, were the government in a
position to query or criticize the bank’s choice of target, it would
seriously undermine the latter’s credibility, since it would lead people to
wonder whether the central bank’s independence might be abrogated
by a future revision to the law. What one government enacts, another
can repeal. Having, instead, the government and central bank jointly set
the target commits the former to the stated objective, and makes it
harder for the government to criticize the means whereby the bank
achieves the agreed end. So the joint nature of the target-setting process
may enhance its credibility.
It is, however, arguable that, since an opposition party’s task is to
oppose, it may be more likely to commit itself against continuation of a
policy of price stability if the latter is represented by the government’s
target than if it is the responsibility of the bank alone to set it. The point
is debatable. Again, some may question whether the government, if
party to the agreement, might not set the target too lax, on political time
inconsistency grounds. On the other hand it would be difficult for a
government publicly to raise the target inflation rate; even the newly
victorious Canadian Liberal Party, who had had their reservations about
Governor John Crow’s policies, stuck to the same target rate when
extending the period forward to 1998. Moreover, if the payment to
senior bank officials, or their reappointment, were to rest on achieving
their inflation target, they too could have an incentive to set numbers
that were too easily achievable, rather than too demanding.
Incentives and Structure
In any case, this discussion raises the question of what the incentive
structure for the governor and the board of the central bank should be.
Under the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act, it is implied that failure to
achieve the agreed target would result in the Governor not being
reappointed. While this may have some considerable incentive effect, it
will be less so if the Governor is reaching retirement age. Moreover, the
incentive/threat is not easily, or finely, calibrated; one would hardly
dismiss for a miss of 0.1 percent, but then what extent of failure would
justify refusal to reappoint? It would inevitably be both uncertain and
arbitrary. Finally, this incentive is applicable only if final responsibility
for central bank outcomes rests in the sole person of the governor. While
this concentration of responsibility on one person has the benefit of
transparency, it does make that individual the focus for personal and
political pressure.
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for decisions lies with a larger directorate, committee, or board. When
the Banque de France was made independent (1993), responsibility for
monetary policy-making was transferred from the Governor to a Mon-
etary Policy Council. On the other hand, one can hardly sack a whole
board. One could, perhaps, have the votes and decisions of individual
board members publicly recorded, and then not reappoint those who
had, ex post, been judged to have voted too often the "wrong" way. But
that too would be an arbitrary and messy exercise.
A simpler alternative would appear to be to set the payment for
those responsible for policy, for example the board members, depen-
dent on their success in achieving the target. With the single focus on
price stability, and its transformation into a numerical target, success
and failure can be readily calibrated and (bonus) payments provided
accordingly. This straightforward idea has now been granted academic
support in several papers by Walsh (1993 and 1994a and b) and by
Persson and Tabellini (1993 and 1994). The last two authors state (1994,
p. 11) that "’the optimal contract can be interpreted as a mandate to
achieve price stability. The central bank is punished ... for any
percentage point of inflation. Essentially, by punishing ex post the
central bank for realized inflation, this contract adds a cost that the
central bank has "forgotten": the cost of higher expected inflation ....
the inflation bias [of the central bank] . . . can be corrected simply by
adding the correct marginal cost of inflation to the central bank’s ex post
social welfare function." Indeed, the authors castigate researchers in
this field for not having seen this contractual approach before now,
stating, "We find it remarkable that the contractual solution to the
problem is so simple and that researchers, including ourselves, working
in the field have failed to see it."
One of us, in 1989, when acting as an adviser to the Reserve Bank
of New Zealand, had indeed advocated such a system of payment for
the Governor, depending on results. For a time it was quite widely
believed that such a bonus payment system had actually been adopted
there, but it was in fact rejected during the preliminary discussions. The
reason was primarily presentational. There was worry, especially at the
Treasury, about the possibility of headlines representing that "Governor
makes $500,000 by throwing 500,000 out of work." Perhaps, once again,
this is an issue that may be reconsidered when the transition to (almost)
zero inflation has been achieved, so that the balance of policy need not
be quite so deflationary as during the transition.
An argumenffoften given against central bankers being paid by their
results is that the final outcome, and hence their payment, would be
affected by various (short-term) shocks over which they have no control.
Indeed so, but the impact of some supply shocks can be, and has been,
expressly excluded from the contract, as has already been described.
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by unforeseen and uncontrollable shocks, and no one suggests that this
is a valid reason for dispensing with profit-related compensation for
business leaders. Once the bottom line is clear and calculable; remuner-
ation can be related to its achievement.
One possible concern, however, is that the inducement to hit the
final numerical target is already so great, and the uncertainty of being
able to achieve it so large, that central bankers may try to get inflation
down to the target level in advance of the terminal year, to give
themselves the best chance of a relatively easy run in the final year.4
Thus, the incentives for central bankers may already be to shorten and
tighten the transition period, possibly excessively so, once numerical
targets are introduced, even without the bait of a bonus payment.
Certainly the structure and design of incentive arrangements for central
bankers in this new context need careful thought.
Accountability
This leads on to the rather wider question of how an independent
central bank can remain democratically accountable. Once again it is the
focus on a primary single objective, price stability, that enables account-
ability to be allied, as a complement rather than a contradiction, with
"independence," especially if that price stability objective is expressed
in a quantified numerical target, and the target to be achieved, or at least
the procedures involved, have the blessing of the government. In such
a case, choices between alternative objectives, which are inherently
political choices, are minimized. Society, acting through its elected
bodies, has specified quite closely what its agent, the central bank, is to
aim to perform. All that remains is to report, usually to the legislative
body, how well the bank has carried out this task.
In truth the democratic accountability of an "independent" central
bank, mandated to the achievement of price stability as its overriding
objective, is both far greater and much more transparent than that of a
subservient central bank, charged with trying to make trade-off compro-
mises between a variety of objectives under the tutelage of a political
master. It is odd that the issue of accountability has been raised as an
argument against such central bank "independence," whereas properly
seen it is an argument in favor of such autonomy. The true, underlying
issue is rather whether the single, overriding focus on price stability is,
indeed, optimal.                                :
~ Both Governor Don Brash of New Zealand and Governor John Crow of Canada
brought inflation down rapidly to, or below, the rate specified in the agreement a year
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Strategic Issues in the Use of Targets
A subservient central bank does not need a target, at least on its
own accord, since it will be carrying out the wishes of its political
masters, who may or may not establish targets for themselves. An
independent and autonomous central bank, on the other hand, has a
greater need for some, preferably quantified, target objective, to provide
both greater transparency and a basis for accounting for its actions as
agent. Once again, we emphasize the close linkage between having a
single main focus for monetary policy, price stability, and the case for
making the bank into an independent agent. It is, therefore, assumed
that an independent central bank will want a publicly announced target
to be established for itself.
Such a target can be either for a final or for an intermediate
objective. The final target now almost universally chosen by central
banks is price stability and, for those banks directly targeting on this
final objective, this has mapped into specific numerical targets for the
inflation rate of the RPI/CPI. Few banks now target final objectives
directly, with only one so far, Sweden, in Continental Europe. Instead,
the majority of other central banks in this study’s sample use interme-
diate targets, mostly pegging their exchange rate within the Exchange
Rate Mechanism or prospectively so at some future date.
This section will first consider the comparative advantages and
disadvantages of having a publicly announced target for the final
objective rather than for an intermediate variable. Of course, central
banks targeting directly on inflation, via the RPI or CPI, may also have
subsidiary targets for intermediate variables such as exchange rates
(New Zealand is an example), which may or may not be announced or
otherwise publicly known. Equally, countries mainly targeting on inter-
mediate variables, such as Germany or Switzerland, will adjust their
response to the outcomes of those targets by their perceptions of the
concurrent and future course of inflation itself. Nevertheless, it is
usually clear enough which is the main target, and this is set out for the
countries in this sample in Table 1 and in Table 2 (below). Next, the
relative advantages and disadvantages among the possible intermediate
targets will be considered, of which exchange rates and monetary
aggregates have been the main, but not the only, candidates.
Final versus Intermediate Targets
Insofar as the final objective of almost all central banks is to achieve
price stability, and this concept is capable of reasonable measurement,
then the simplest and most obvious route would seem to be to target
that objective directly. If this outcome is what we want central banks to
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incentive structure that will maximize the chance of them doing so?
Proponents of this approach would argue that concentrating instead on
some intermediate variable, such as the money stock, introduces com;
plexity, since the links between monetary changes and price inflation
are variable, and reduces transparency and understanding, since the
relevance and significance of somewhat arbitrary monetary aggregates
will be far less clear to the general public than the concept of inflation
and price stability. Persson and Tabellini express the same thought, in
more formal and rigorous terms (1994, pp. 14-15):
[I]t is clear that the inflation contract is more direct and simpler to enforce
[than an intermediate target] .... Hence, a contract based on an intermediate
monetary target is much more demanding on the principal’s information
compared to an inflation contract .... Generally, the principal finds it easier
to monitor the outcome rather than the policy instrument, because the
optimal instrument choice depends on detailed information which may not
be available to the principal. We are thus led to a general conclusion. An
inflation contract.., minimizes the informational requirement of the prin-
cipal and thus generally dominates contracts based on intermediate monetary
targets or directly on the policy instrument.
Yet despite such arguments, relatively few central banks employ
direct inflation targets, and those, mostly recently. A much larger
number of central banks employ intermediate targets, as Persson and
Tabellini recognize. One reason for this may have been historical
accident, depending on the actual temporal evolution of ideas and
operations in the field. Thus, the widespread consensus on focusing on
the single objective of price stability is quite recent. The adoption of such
a single intermediate target, for the exchange rate or for monetary
aggregates, may have allowed the central bank to work to a single
target--and hence enhance its independence and autonomy--at an
earlier date when the views of the general public, or of politicians, on
the choice of final objectives made autonomy a more contentious matter.
A much more substantive argument in favor of intermediate tar-
gets, which Persson and Tabellini also note, is the much longer lag
between policy action and inflation than between such action and effects
in financial markets. Thus they ask (1994, p. 15):
Why do we see exchange rate targets or monetary targets often imposed (or
self imposed) on central bankers, but rarely see central bankers accountable
for the rate of inflation? One reasons may have to do with the commitment
5 They also propose a second reason. They suggest that the central bank may be risk
averse, and therefore "clearly prefers a contract contingent on the money supply or some
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technology available to the principal. The effect of policy actions on asset
prices or the money supply is readily observable. [This is an assertion that we
would dispute, ourselves.] The effect on prices is observable only with
substantial delay. It may thus be harder for society to commit to "punishing"
a central bank for actions undertaken six months or a year ago. [Again, we
regard this as an underestimate of the problem; the lag may be twice as long.]
If the central bank deviates from a financial target the penalty is more
immediately related to the policy actions. It may therefore be easier to sustain
such penalties than in the case of inflation targets.
Such long lags between action and inflation outcome undoubtedly
complicate the working of a direct inflation target. The case for an
intermediate target is that this could provide a much earlier signal
whether policy is being appropriately applied, as Benjamin Friedman
has pointed out in earlier classic papers (and in Friedman 1990).
Given these long lags in the effects of monetary policy on the final
objective, price stability, and the uncertainties thereby involved, central
banks are bound to pay attention to the development of key intermedi-
ate variables such as monetary aggregates. But how much attention
should be paid to each variable, and whether one or more should be
elevated to the level of target, as contrasted with the rather more flexible
concept of informational variable, will generally depend on the per-
ceived constancy and reliability of the relationships involved. Such
perceptions have varied over time, and between countries.
If an intermediate target is to be adopted, which might be best?
Three possibilities will be reviewed: an interest rate target, an exchange
rate target, and the best selection from a range of possible monetary
aggregate targets.
Interest Rate Targets
The short-term interest rate has the advantage that it is the main
policy instrument used by the central bank; changes in it are the result
of policy decisions (primarily) and are instantaneously and accurately
measured in nominal terms. But the problem is that the relevant
measures for affecting the economy are real interest rates and some
interest differentials. These either are measured very uncertainly be-
cause of the problem of observing heterogeneous expectations, or are
subject, as in the case of interest differentials, to structural change; their
miss more frequently." The validity of this argument is doubtful. First, the intermediate
targets, either monetary aggregates or exchange rates, are not, and have not proved to be
easily controllable. Indeed, actual experience with hitting inflation targets, to date, has
been much better than with monetary targets; the Exchange Rate Mechanism has also had
its difficulties. Second, it is doubtful whether central bankers, as a group, have withdrawn
from accepting appropriate targets just because of the problems of hitting them.158 Charles A.E. Goodhart and Josd Vi~ials
effect on either financial flows or final expenditures is uncertain and
time-varying. Here again, there is a general consensus that estimates of
real interest rates and of certain key interest differentials (such as the
slope of the yield curve) should be important information variables for
central bankers, but that they are not well suited to act as intermediate
targets.
Exchange Rate Targets
The intermediate target variable most commonly used in Europe
has been the exchange rate. As shown in Table 2, most European
countries have made this their sole or main target. The comparative
success of the Exchange Rate Mechanism, at least until 1992 and 1993,
and the aspirations of other European countries outside the Community
to become full members in due course and in the meantime to peg their
currencies to the ECU or the deutsche mark, have been responsible for
the popularity of exchange rate intermediate targets.
They have many virtues as such. Exchange rates are accurately and
immediately measured; they respond instantaneously to changes in
interest rates; they are widely understood by the public; and they have
a general and broad impact on the economy, depending on the degree
of openness. By pegging to the currency of another country/central bank
with credibility in the pursuit of price stability, the international com-
mitment involved can lead to a quicker and greater transfer of anti-
inflationary credibility than attempts to establish a domestic reputation
singlehandedly. Even where a country has determined to follow a
domestic price/inflation target directly, it may still, as in the case of New
Zealand, regard the exchange rate as such an important determinant
and signal of future inflationary pressures that it will establish an
(informal) operational target for the exchange rate: Thus the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand will vary interest rates up (or down) if a trigger
point (which they decide for themselves) is reached. Such trigger points,
one way or another, usually become known in markets.
Some versions of such intermediate targets, notably currency board
systems, as in Argentina (since 1991), Estonia (since 1992), and Hong
Kong (since 1983), may have the added advantage of distancing the
determination of monetary policy from domestic political control. Such
currency boards may be viewed as a way of transferring monetary policy
to an independent central bank, in this case foreign rather than
domestic.
The disadvantage, of course, as was dearly evident in Europe in
1992 and 1993, is that the monetary policy best suited to the leading,
anchor country may not be appropriate, at any rate in the short run, to
the countries pegging to it, for example, because of large real asymmet-
ric shocks. The problems of the Exchange Rate Mechanism followingSTRATEGY AND TACTICS OF MONETARY POLICY 159
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Monetary Policy Strategies in the European Union
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German reunification are well known. Another example has been the
need for Hong Kong to keep low, U.S0-1evel nominal interest rates in
order to maintain "the link," at a time when its participation in the
surging economy of Southern China has led to a booming economy and
moderate inflation.
Yet, as these examples also indicate, the advantages of an exchange
rate link to a stable central economy are so considerable that, despite the
manifold 1992-93 problems for the Exchange Rate Mechanism, most160 Charles A,E. Goodhart and Josd Vi~ials
countries in Europe retain that link as their main objective. Hong Kong
also remains determined to keep the link with the U.S. dollar. And, of
course, the advantages of proceeding from stably linked currencies to
monetary union within Europe are still seen as a prize to be achieved as
soon as practicable.
Some circumstances and conditions are conducive to the use of the
exchange rate as an intermediate target (for example, for smaller, open
countries with poorer reputations for price stability) and a desire for
enhanced economic and political union with their neighbors. In other
circumstances (such as larger, more closed economies subject to asym-
metric shocks, with no expectation or desire for greater union) an
exchange-rate intermediate target would dearly be inappropriate. This
leads to a brief consideration of the use of monetary targets, primarily
within the European context.
Monetary Targets
In line with what happened in other parts of the world, since the
mid seventies a number of European countries have relied heavily on
monetary aggregates to formulate their monetary policy. Monetary
aggregates thus became the intermediate target of monetary policy. The
best-known and paradigmatic example in using monetary targets is
Germany, but other countries such as France, Italy, Spain, and the
United Kingdom (until 1987) established and publicly announced an-
nual ranges for the growth of a selected monetary aggregate--typically
a broad aggregate.6 The practice of publicly announcing monetary
targets has continued to the present in the first four countries, including
the periods when their currencies have formed part of the Exchange
Rate Mechanism (Germany and France since 1979; Italy from 1979 to
September 1992; and Spain since June 1989).
By European standards, these countries have relatively large and
not so open economies (Table 3). In contrast, small open economies like
those of Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Denmark
have relied primarily on the exchange rate as the intermediate target of
monetary policy. Portugal set monetary targets in the 1987-92 period,
but it has recently shifted exclusively to setting exchange rate targets,
following the entry of the escudo into the Exchange Rate Mechanism in
mid 1992. (Table 2 summarizes the monetary policy strategies currently
adopted in the European Union.)
But why did Germany, France, Spain, and Italy adopt monetary
targets in the first place? In the mid seventies, industrialized countries
6 In addition to these countries, Greece has been setting monetary targets uninter-
ruptedly since the mid eighties.STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF MONETARY POLICY 161
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were going through a period of high inflation and inflationary expecta-
tions, following the occurrence of supply-side shocks. At the same time
as inflation worries mounted, shifting inflationary expectations made
nominal interest rates less useful as policy guides, and thus the attention
of central banks turned to monetary aggregates. Central banks found
that monetary targets provided a considerably simpler and more trans-
parent way of formulating monetary policy, one that could limit the
room for discretion within the year, favorably influence the inflationary
expectations of the public by providing a medium-term reference, and
permit the central bank a higher degree of de facto autonomy in
pursuing the final goals of monetary policy.162 Charles A.E. Goodhart and Josd Vi~ials
More precisely, when reading through the many central bank
reports and speeches given by officials over the years to explain this
strategic choice, one comes up with several reasons why some European
central banks have been using monetary aggregates as intermediate
targets (see also Bernanke and Mishkin 1992). In particular, these rest on
the following beliefs: Monetary aggregates are linked in a rather stable
and predictable manner to the medium-term evolution of nominal
variables. They can be controlled by central banks within reasonable
limits, and they are helpful in conveying information to the public about
the medium-term orientation of monetary policy. Since they are within
the scope of monetary policy, they facilitate monitoring by the public,
and they allow a better division of responsibilities between the central
bank and the government, thus avoiding external political pressures on
monetary policy.
From the above description, it is clear that the reasons behind the
choice of monetary targets square well with those given by the models
of optimal monetary policy in the tradition of Poole (1970). That is,
monetary targets are suitable when the shocks affecting the economy
come mainly from the demand for goods. In these cases, the evolution
of monetary aggregates is more closely connected to that of the final
variables, and by controlling money the deviations of final variables
from their targeted values are minimized. Furthermore, it is only under
these circumstances that the potentially favorable game-theoretic and
expectational effects from setting monetary targets, described above, are
also obtained. In particular, as Englander (1990) suggests, when the
monetary aggregate chosen is not linked in a stable and predictable way
to the final variables--as a result of unforeseen velocity shocks--this has
very unfavorable effects on the public’s expectations. In particular, a
strategy of refusing to accommodate velocity shocks in order to earn
anti-inflationary credibility would result in misses regarding the final
objective; and full accommodation would run the risk of undermining
the usefulness of monetary targets in the first place as a device to
influence the public’s expectations.
Over the years, and as economic integration progressed, many
European central banks came to the view that membership in the
Exchange Rate Mechanism could be an important way of fostering
anti-inflationary credibility through the linking of their monetary poli-
cies to that of Germany, whose central bank enjoyed the best anti-
inflationary reputation. As a result, in some European countries, gen-
erally those with smaller and more open economies, the exchange rate
became the intermediate target for monetary policy. In larger, relatively
less open economies like France, Italy, and Spain, while the institutional
constraints associated with Exchange Rate Mechanism membership
clearly placed the exchange rate at the center stage of monetary policy,
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continued to set monetary targets. Therefore, it can be said that, in
practice, these latter countries have set both exchange rate and mone-
tary targets, although with the increase in international capital mobility
the exchange rate has become the central target of monetary policy, as
will be discussed in the next section.
Operational Issues for Targetry
The Operation of Direct Inflation Targets
The main problem in successfully managing a system of direct
inflation targets arises from the combination of long lags in the effect of
monetary policy and uncertainty, both about future shocks and, more
importantly, about the structure of the economic system itself, especially
the precise effects of changes in monetary policy instruments on the
economy. Without such uncertainty, policy could be set now to deliver
an expected future rate of inflation with some degree of confidence.
Without the lags, policy could be varied, despite the uncertainty, until
the designated inflation rate was achieved. Given such lags, the attempt
to use monetary policy to the extreme to force a given change in inflation
in the shorter run might prove impossible and would cause instrument
instability whereby interest rates could become explosively unstable, as
almost seemed at one time to be happening in the United States in the
1979-81 period. Many, and perhaps the most severe, of the problems of
operating monetary policy are caused by such lags, especially in the case
of direct price inflation objectives.
In these circumstances, an enormous weight of responsibility rests
on the shoulders of the chief economic forecaster in the central bank,
charged with the duty of forecasting what inflation rate could be expected,
on an unchanged policy assumption. This responsibility will be even more
onerous if the forecaster is also asked to project what policy change now
will be needed to drive future inflation into line with the target. The
accuracy of those forecasts will be crucial to the success of the central bank
in meeting its mandate. Moreover, the standard problems of inflation
forecasting almost certainly will be exacerbated by the Lucas critique in
this case. The wage/price decisions of agents will be affected, in ways
that are difficult to predict in advance, by their perceptions of how the
new regime may itself operate. The role of chief economic forecaster in
central banks adopting this regime is not enviable.
Perhaps because of these problems, some tendency has been appar-
ent in both Canada and New Zealand for the central bank to press ahead
with getting inflation down to, or below, the target level rather in
advance of the agreed horizon. If the Bank of England were more
autonomous, it might wish to do the same. Whereas the hypothesis164 Charles A.E. Goodhart and Josd Vi~ials
about the inflationary bias of the monetary authorities is well known
from the time consistency literature, we would tentatively suggest that
an independent central bank with an overriding priority to achieve a
numerical target for inflation might have a transitional deflationary bias.
The Operation of Exchange Rate Targets
The main problem, of course, with exchange rate targets is that the
nominal interest rates needed to maintain the exchange rate link may
represent a real interest rate unsuited to the peripheral country, for
example, because of asymmetric shocks. Indeed, when this syndrome
becomes particularly acute, as in the Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992
and 1993, adjustments in nominal interest rates may even become
ineffective in influencing capital flows and maintaining the exchange
rate, because the resulting real interest rate is perceived by markets as
domestically unsustainable. There were even occasions during that
prolonged crisis when increases (decreases) in interest rates had a
perverse effect in causing depreciation (appreciation) in the exchange
rate, for this reason.
The normal response in such cases, where one instrument, the
interest rate, is asked to achieve two mutually inconsistent objectives, is
to try to find another instrument. One proposal, by Eichengreen and
Wyplosz (1993), has been to revert to some version of exchange controls
in order to keep interest rates at levels more appropriate domestically.
Another alternative is to try to offset the deleterious domestic effects of
inappropriate real interest rates by other measures and instruments.
However, the attempt to find alternative instruments to ease the policy
strains has not been markedly successful. The conceptual and practical
shortcomings of any attempted reimposition of exchange controls are
well-known, and the attempt to offset inappropriate interest rate levels
by an adjustment in fiscal policy (or by variations in direct credit
controls) runs into other, again well-known, problems. It is such
difficulties that make many commentators skeptical that a pegged, but
adjustable, exchange rate regime can represent a stable equilibrium in a
world of free capital movements, in the absence of close policy coordi-
nation. Such considerations are influencing views and attitudes toward
both the speed of achieving, and the optimal transition path to,
economic and monetary union.
The Operation of Monetary Targets
In practice, the main operational issues surrounding the implemen-
tation of monetary targets concern the choice of monetary aggregate; the
reference period over which it is set; the speed with which deviations
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drift should be allowed. In order to guide their decisions concerning the
above issues, central banks normally make use of the information
contained in other monetary, financial, and economic variables. This
tends to blur, in practice, the difference between the "one-step" and
"two-step" approaches to monetary policy. In particular, by letting the
growth of monetary aggregates differ from mid-point target ranges in
response to well-identified disturbances, central banks can hope to
conduct policy with few informational inefficiencies and nevertheless
still benefit from favorable expectational effects but, to be successful, this
depends greatly on their prior reputation and credibility.
Important operational issues also arise when central banks try to
influence the course of monetary growth in the desired direction. For
instance, the remuneration at market rates of certain components of the
targeted monetary aggregate may make it difficult to reduce monetary
growth, say, by increasing official interest rates, and may, at times,
actually have the opposite effect. In addition, when international finan-
cial markets are closely integrated, countries in the Exchange Rate
Mechanism trying to reduce monetary growth through contractionary
liquidity operations may easily see their attempts frustrated by inward
capital flows.
The economic effects of adopting monetary targets may thus de-
pend significantly on how they have been implemented in practice. In
order to assess how flexible the conduct of monetary targets has been in
Europe, information on the targeted and actual money growth rates of
Germany, France, Italy, and Spain is shown in Table 4. As is clear from
the table, elements of short-run flexibility have been present in the
management of monetary targets: Targets have generally been ex-
pressed as ranges rather than as a single value; on many occasions, the
recorded monetary growth has been within the range but not close to
the mid-point; at times, targets have been undershot or overshot; base
drift has been significant; and the specific monetary aggregate playing
the role of intermediate target has changed over time as financial
innovation has evolved.
All in all, monetary aggregates have played a useful role in the
pursuit of anti-inflationary monetary policies in the above countries
during many years. However, their interpretation has become increas-
ingly complex as a result of the ongoing processes of financial innova-
tion and deregulation, and their controllability more precarious in an
environment of exchange rate stability and free capital mobility.
As regards financial innovation, the new cash management tech-
niques used by firms adapting to the possibilities of an increasingly
sophisticated and deregulated financial environment, and the shift of
household financial holdings towards remunerated liquid assets, have
provoked important changes in the sectoral composition of monetary
holdings. This has led to an increasing difficulty in interpreting,the166 Charles A.E. Goodhart and Jos# Vi~als
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Notes: H/M: target hit/missed. When single-value target, it is assumed an implicit range of -+ 1.5%; +/-: monetary
above/below target; rev: target revised during the year.
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1980 11 9.8 H
1981 12 (rev) 11.4 H
1982 12.5-13.5 11.5 M-
1983 9 (rev) I0.2 H
1984 5.5-6.5 7.6 M+
1985 M2R 4-6 6.9 M+
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1987 M2 (new) 3-5 9.2 M+
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evolution of monetary aggregates, as testified by the reduced stability of
demand for money functions (see Fase 1993). Finally, in Europe, the
process of financial innovation has been accelerated, most recently
through the introduction of financial legislation associated with the
establishment in 1992 of the Single Internal Market. In particular, banks
from member states have been allowed to do business without restric-
tions throughout the European Union.
The other major development affecting the implementation of
monetary targets in European countries has to do with the constraints
imposed by the Exchange Rate Mechanism. As mentioned earlier on,
Germany has traditionally played the anchor role in the System; that is,
the Bundesbank has freely set German monetary policy, and the other
countries have adapted their domestic monetary conditions so as to
maintain exchange rate stability. But how much monetary autonomy
has been left to those non-anchor countries like France, Italy, or Spain,
which set monetary targets?
It is well known that when a country adopts a fixed exchange rate,
the money supply becomes fully endogenous when the following
conditions are simultaneously satisfied: The country does not exert a
significant influence on the level of international interest rates; interna-
tional capital mobility is perfect; and perfect substitutability exists
between domestic and foreign bonds. In these circumstances, the
domestic monetary authorities can only influence the breakdown of
monetary growth between its domestic and external sources, but lose
control of the total. And while the rate of monetary growth can be set ex
ante so as to be compatible with the maintenance of exchange rate
stability, the presence of shocks will, in general, make actual money
growth differ ex post from the targeted value, if exchange rate stability
is indeed preserved.
It is clear from the above that, other things equal, setting monetary
targets outside Germany would make sense only if some of the previous
conditions do not hold. In particular, the room for domestic monetary
autonomy on the part of the non-anchor countries will tend to be larger
when there is a band within which exchange rates can move, when
central parities can be adjusted, when capital mobility is not perfect, and
when domestic and foreign assets are imperfect substitutes.
From its creation in 1979 until 1987, the Exchange Rate Mechanism
experienced frequent realignments which, coupled with the presence of
exchange controls in the countries with relatively weak currencies,
France and Italy, gave some room for maneuver to their respective
monetary authorities as regards monetary control. In contrast, in the
period from 1987 to September 1992, the Exchange Rate Mechanism
experienced no general realignment and capital controls were elimi-
nated in most member countries with a view to the establishment of the
Single Internal Market. This made it increasingly difficult for non-anchor168 Charles A.E. Goodhart and Josd Vitals
countries to meet monetary targets while preserving exchange rate
stability. Subsequently, the crisis from September 1992 to July 1993 led
to the exit of the British pound and the Italian lira from the Mechanism;
to the devaluation of the peseta, the escudo, and the Irish pound; and to
the widening of the bilateral fluctuation bands to + 15 percent after
August 2, 1993.
As a result of the widening of the bands, the participating countries
have now regained some margin of maneuver for adapting monetary
developments to domestic conditions. In other words, while the ex-
change rate remains the fundamental variable as far as monetary policy
is concerned, at least for most of the remaining Exchange Rate Mecha-
nism countries, the recent changes in the Mechanism may have allowed
the monetary authorities of countries setting monetary targets some
room to improve their control over their national moneys.
All in all, however, even if at present it can be claimed that central
banks have a better control over monetary targets than a couple of years
ago, the ongoing process of financial innovation continues to pose
serious problems regarding the effectiveness of such strategy. It is for
this reason that we consider that those European central banks with a
long tradition in setting monetary targets are becoming, with the
passage of time, more pragmatic in the implementation of their mone-
tary strategies, given the prevalence of the exchange rate target. Even in
Germany, where the only target is the growth of M3, monetary growth
has recently been allowed to be well in excess of the target range. The
structural changes derived from unification, the processes of financial
innovation and deregulation, and the foreign exchange interventions of
the Bundesbank on behalf of other currencies during the Exchange Rate
Mechanism crisis, are all factors that at least partly account for the
excessive monetary growth recorded in Germany in past years and also
at present. In spite of this, the Bundesbank has continued to pursue a
cautious policy of interest rate reductions in the light of the diminishing
inflationary pressures observed in the German economy, which sug-
gests that monetary targets are being implemented in a pragmatic
manner.
The Implications of Economic and Monetary
Union for Monetary Strategy and Tactics
in Europe
The Treaty on European Union, enacted on November 1, 1993,
contemplates the creation of a Monetary Union in Europe within the
present decade. According to the Treaty, the European System of
Central Banks will formulate and implement the single monetary policySTRATEGY AND TACTICS OF MONETARY POLICY 169
in the Union. However, the Treaty does not allow for any gradual
transfer of monetary sovereignty from’ national authorities towards the
central institutions before the establishment of the Monetary Union:
This means that a sort of "Big Bang" will occur on the very day when the
Union is created, with a sudden shift from coexisting national monetary
policies, formulated in the pursuit of national objectives and imple-
mented through different procedures, to a single monetary policy, set by
a supranational institution with Union-wide objectives and operated in
a consistent way throughout the area.
While the future creation of the Monetary Union represents a shock
of unprecedented magnitude, the anticipation of that shock gives time
to prepare the regulatory and logistical framework necessary for the
European System of Central Banks effectively to carry out the single
monetary policy from the very first day. This preparatory work is a
major task of the European Monetary Institute, an institution created
January 1, 1994 as precursor of the future European Central Bank.
This section will describe the present nature of monetary operations
in European countries, then proceed to examine briefly the objectives
and nature of the European System of Central Banks, and conclude with
a discussion of the main operational reforms and adjustments needed to
prepare the future single monetary policy.
How Different at Present Is the Implementation of Monetary
Policy in the Various European Countries?
Previous sections of this paper have already discussed a number of
key issues concerning the final objectives of monetary policy and the
various strategies available for achieving these objectives. With regard to
European countries, the information contained in Appendix Table 1
suggests that while price stability constitutes de facto the final objective
of monetary policy in most countries, national central banks vary quite
considerably as regards their degree of formal and effective autonomy.
In addition, Table 2 has indicated important differences in the monetary
policy strategies followed in the various European countries to pursue the
final objectives.
Not tackled yet are the more technical and operational issues
concerning the execution of monetary policy in the various countries.7
Recently, methods of executing monetary policy in European countries
have converged in two main respects. First, open market operations
increasingly have been used to regulate liquidity conditions, which has
made them the main monetary instrument in most countries. And
7 Consult the 1993 Annual Report of the Committee of Governors of European Central
Banks for a clear description of national monetary policy instruments and procedures in
the European Union. See also Padoa-Schioppa and Saccomanni (1992).170 Charles A.E, Goodhart and J0s~ Vi~ials
second, money market interest rates have become established as the
main operational target in the daily conduct of monetary policy.
In spite of this, significant differences remain across countries
concerning the use of other monetary policy instruments and proce-
dures. Table 5 summarizes the respective national roles played by
reserve requirements, standing facilities, and open market operations.
Reserve requirements are used to very different extents in the various
countries in the process of regulating liquidity conditions. Indeed, in
spite of the trend in recent years in the European Union toward
lowering reserve requirements, which has taken place as a result of the
desire to improve competition and efficiency in the banking industry,
important national differences remain regarding the level and remuner-
ation of reserve requirements, as can be seen in part A of Table 5. For
example, while such requirements are not used for monetary policy
purposes at present in countries like Belgium, Denmark, the Nether-
lands, and the United Kingdom, they are still used in the other
countries, and in particular in Portugal and Italy. In the latter two
countries, monetary authorities traditionally have employed reserve
requirements to induce or enlarge the demand for bank reserves and,
when coupled with averaging provisions, to allow the banking system
to cope better with situations of excess or insufficient liquidity, thus
reducing the need for direct central bank intervention in the market.
Standing facilities offered by central banks to financial institutions on
a bilateral basis (discount window, other direct credit and deposit lines)
constitute another instrument at the disposal of central banks to regulate
liquidity conditions. As seen in part B of Table 5, while these facilities
play little or no role in the majority of European countries, they are quite
important in Italy and Germany and most important in the Netherlands,
where they account for a significant part of the supply of liquidity.
In spite of the increasingly important role of open market operations in
regulating liquidity conditions in all countries, only in the United
Kingdom, Denmark, and Portugal are they the main instrument. In
addition, part C of Table 5 shows the significant differences in the ways
in which these operations are conducted in the various European
countries (for example, types of assets used, frequency of operations,
and procedures to auction liquidity).
Finally, it is important to mention that until recently a number of
national central banks in Europe have been financing the public sector,
although this is not specifically a part of monetary policy operations.
However, with the enactment of the Treaty on European Union, central
banks have been prohibited since January 1, 1994 from giving overdrafts
or other types of credit facilities to the public sector and from purchasing
public debt directly in the primary market. The purchasing of public
debt in the secondary market is also forbidden for purposes other than
regulating monetary conditions. As suggested by the various initialTable 5
Monetary Policy Instruments and Procedures in the European Union
Item Belgium Denmark Germany Greece Spain France Ireland Italy    Netherlands Portugal U.K.
A. Permanent Reserve
Requirements for Monetary
Policy Purposes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
--Size (% of GDP)a -- -- 2.7 3.9 2.0 .1 1.8 8.0
--Remuneration -- -- No Partly No No Below Partly
B. Standing Facilitiesb market rates
--Lending facilities at [] -- ¯ .... ¯
below or close to (below (close to
market rate(s) market) market)
--Deposit facilities [] [] .... ¯ --
--Marginal refinancing [] -- [] ¯ [] [] ¯ ¯
C. Open Market Operations
1 : Typesb
--Outright transactions° [] [] [] ~ -- ¯ -- ¯
--Reserved transactions in [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []
domestic securities
--Foreign currency swap ~, [] [] [] [] -- [] ¯
transactions
2. Frequency of operationsd [] ~, [] ~, ¯ ~, [] ¯
3. Auction proceduresb
--volume tender [] [] [] -- [] -- -- --
--interest rate tender [] -- [] [] [] [] [] []






a Amount outstanding at the end of 1992.
b Importance in providing (or withdrawing) liquidity to (or from) the market: [] Low; ~, Intermediate; [] High.
c These include issues of certificates of deposit by the central bank in the cases of Denmark and Portugal, and unsecured overnight loans in the case of Greece.
d [] About once a week; ~, Several times a week; [] More than once a day.
Source: Annual Report of the Committee of Governors of European Central Banks, 1993.172 Charles A.E. Goodhart and Jos~ Vi~als
national situations, the impacts of these recent legislative changes are
likely to be felt rather differently across Europe.
The European System of Central Banks:
Objectives and Autonomy
The Treaty on Economic and Monetary Union concluded at Maas-
tricht sets price stability as the primary objective of the European System
of Central Banks and establishes that the general economic policies in
the European Union shall be supported only so long as this does not
conflict with price stability. While the aim is to avoid the potential
conflicts that arise when all the objectives are at par, no specific
definition is given in the Statute of what constitutes price stability or of
the criteria to assess when price stability enters into conflict with other
policies. In practice, however, many central bankers would regard a rate
of inflation between 0 and 2 or 3 percent as consistent with price
stability.
In addition to a clear mandate to fight inflation, the future European
System of Central Banks is equipped with a significant degree of
institutional and functional autonomy. As concerns institutional autonomy,
the Statute tries to ensure that governments will not interfere in the
monetary decision-making process. The following statutory provisions
are related to this goal: prohibition of seeking or receiving instructions
from government bodies; the requirement that the statutes of the
member central banks guarantee their respective institutional and func-
tional autonomy; assured tenure for the members of the governing
bodies of the System; and strict conditions on amending the Statute in
any fundamental way. As concerns functional autonomy, the Statute
gives the System full powers to use monetary policy instruments,
subject to the constraint that they be compatible with market principles.
As indicated by the comparative analysis of Alesina and Grilli
(1992), the European System of Central Banks will enjoy a very high
degree of formal autonomy in monetary policy-making. Nevertheless,
since the Treaty places decisions on exchange rate policy outside the
System, the effective autonomy of the new institution might be compro-
mised, as the monetary stance required to maintain price stability may
conflict with exchange rate objectives. To minimize this risk, the Treaty
states that exchange rate decisions will be taken only after consulting the
System in an attempt to reach a consensus consistent with the objective
of price stability.
The Single Monetary Policy
The Maastricht Treaty establishes that by the end of 1996 at the
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necessary preparations needed for the European System of Central
Banks effectively to carry out the single monetary policy. The scale and
complexity of the task facing the Institute can be readily assessed from
the following two considerations: On the one hand, the absence of any
transfer of monetary power to the Institute makes it impossible to
exercise, even on a small scale, the running of the future single
monetary policy before the establishment of Monetary Union. Contrary
to the spirit of some of the proposals made during the preparation of the
Delors Report, the European Monetary Institute does not have any
authority or instruments to influence the stance of European monetary
policy--a task left for the System of Central Banks. On the other hand,
while the Statute defines the broad principles that should guide the
formulation and execution of the single monetary policy, many strategic
and tactical issues are left fully open in the Statute and have yet to be
addressed.
On the strategic side, an adequate framework must be developed
for formulating monetary policy. This involves considering whether
intermediate targets in general, and monetary targets in particular,
might be useful in the conduct of the future monetary policy of the
European System of Central Banks, as well as exploring which variable
could best play this role. On the tactical side, the necessary infrastruc-
ture must be put in place to allow the proper execution of a single
monetary policy. This means identifying the minimal requirements for
guaranteeing the uniformity of monetary conditions throughout the
Union, and exploring how to execute the single monetary policy with
the optimal degree of decentralization. In what follows, the above issues
are discussed in some greater detail, drawing in part on Monticelli and
Vifials (1993) and Vifials (1994).
Strategic aspects: policy formulation. Concerning the strategic aspects
of formulating a single monetary policy, it is likely that European central
banks will settle for a framework that exhibits considerable simplicity
and transparency and enhances the anti-inflationary credibility of the
System. Although it is too early to tell which specific framework will be
adopted, it is reasonable to assume that intermediate targets may be
assigned an important role in the conduct of monetary policy, on the
basis of the reasons discussed in the previous section. This impression
is reinforced by the fact that some of the most successful and important
central banks in the European Union now rely on intermediate mone-
tary targets. Thus, the adoption of a similar monetary policy strategy by
the System would allow a certain degree of continuity with present
practices and, possibly, also the transfer of a certain degree of anti-
inflationary credibility to the System. Nevertheless, the recent surge in
M3 in Germany, at a time of declining growth in nominal incomes there,
has led to some greater doubts about the value of intermediate monetary
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On the other hand, insofar as the European Union follows a floating
exchange rate policy vis-a-vis third currencies, the controllability of the
money supply at the area level could be greater than some countries
enjoy now at the national level because of the constraints imposed by
the Exchange Rate Mechanism. Finally, the empirical evidence provided
by Kremers and Lane (1990), Artis (1991), Monticelli and Strauss-Kahn
(1991), and Cassard, Lane, and Masson (1994) suggests that a stable
demand for money may exist for the European Union as a whole.
However, even if it were decided in principle to adopt monetary
targets, severe problems still could arise in selecting the monetary or
financial aggregate most suited to this role. The reason is simple: The
passage to Monetary Union constitutes an unprecedented structural
regime change, with major consequences that may alter in unknown
ways the underlying relationships between the evolution of economic
and financial variabl6s and that of final variables. For this reason, much
can be said in favor of a pragmatic policy strategy in the first years after
the creation of the European Monetary Union. In particular, the System
of Central Banks might do best to rely on a number of selected economic
and financial indicators, no doubt including monetary and financial
aggregates, in order to achieve its price stability objective during the first
few years of Monetary Union. Only after things had settled down might
it be possible to assess whether monetary targets were the best way of
formulating the single monetary policy.
Tactical aspects: policy execuqon. It is not possible to predict with any
great degree of accuracy what will be the full effect of the recent creation
of the Single Internal Market on the future shape of the economic and
financial framework of the European Union. Nevertheless, two ques-
tions must now be addressed regarding preparations for future mone-
tary policy in Stage Three. First, what are the minimum requirements for
the conduct of a single monetary policy? And second, what instruments
can be used to execute monetary policy in a more or less decentralized
setting?
These questions implicitly assume that monetary policy instru-
ments and procedures will still differ across member countries when
European Monetary Union is established, and that a non-negligible
degree of decentralization will characterize the execution of the Euro-
pean monetary policy, at least in the early years. The first assumption is
justified because differences in national policy instruments and proce-
dures tend to be persistent and are unlikely to disappear in the next few
years, despite the market forces towards greater competition unleashed
by the Single Internal Market. Moreover, central banks feel comfortable
with their own way of executing monetary policy, and thus they can be
expected to maintain their customary practices, which reflect specific
market and institutional features.
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efficient to execute monetary policy in a somewhat decentralized way,
so as to make use of the considerable human capital accumulated by
central banks in terms of knowledge of national financial institutions. It
also recognizes that the Treaty states that "to the extent deemed possible
and appropriate .... the European Central Bank shall have recourse to
the national central banks to carry out operations" (Article 12.1). These
arguments can be expected to lose force with the passage of time,
ultimately working towards greater centralization in the execution of
monetary policy.
The Minimal Requirements for the
Conduct of a Single Monetary Policy
Money market integration. The most important requirement is the
integration of national interbank markets, so as to ensure that interest
rate arbitrage brings about a single monetary stance throughout the
Union, regardless of where any injection or subtraction of liquidity is
made. For arbitrage to ensure the equalization of interbank interest
rates, credit institutions must be able to transfer their interbank posi-
tions across borders. This, however, does not require the centralization
of payment and settlement systems at the Union level. Instead, all that
is required is that national payment systems are adequately linked to
ensure that interbank funds can be transferred across borders and, once
transferred, can be used for final settlements within the same day.
While these measures are sufficient to create an integrated inter-
bank market and thus permit the conduct of a single monetary policy,
unfortunately they do not ensure the safety of the interbank payment
and settlement system. This requires specific measures to reduce risks,
notably liquidity, credit, and systemic risks, as well as common legal
provisions regulating the finality of payments and the revocability of
payment instructions.
Harmonization. Is the harmonization of monetary policy instruments
and procedures necessary for the achievement of a single monetary
stance through the Union? At a macroeconomic level, this is not really
required since, in theory, for any set of instruments it is always possible
for the European System of Central Banks to hit its intermediate or final
target through appropriate movements of the instruments. Neverthe-
less, two microeconomic reasons suggest that achieving a certain degree
of harmonization among national instruments and procedures might be
very desirable when the European Monetary Union is set up.
The first reason relates to the concern that regulatory arbitrage on
the part of financial institutions could lead to major shifts in the location
of financial activity within the Union, if differences in monetary policy
instruments and procedures implied differences in the cost-subsidy mix
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of reserve requirements is the most obvious example. The conduct of a
single monetary policy could be perfectly compatible with different
reserve requirement provisions within the System (the "European"
money multiplier would be given by a weighted average of "national"
multipliers), as interest rate arbitrage would in any case lead to a single
monetary stance throughout the Community. However, not all financial
institutions would be on the same competitive footing, at least initially,
and the ones penalized by regulation would tend to circumvent it,
moving their activities to more favorable locations.
This line of argument supports the harmonization of reserve re-
quirements (not excluding the zero option) and of the conditions on the
standing facilities offered on a bilateral basis to financial institutions.
Otherwise, the result would be regulatory arbitrage, which would entail
inefficiencies and could lead to a perverse competition between national
central banks. Furthermore, shifts in the location of financial activity
could complicate the conduct of monetary policy, as they would increase
the noise associated with monetary and financial developments. The
signal extraction problem faced by the System of Central Banks would
be exacerbated in a situation that will in any case be difficult, as a result
of the regime change involved by the start of the European Monetary
Union.
The second reason motivating a certain degree of harmonization in
instruments and procedures is that it would facilitate the understanding
of policy signals on the part of the market participants. Particular
conventions (not always corresponding to the use of a specific set of
instruments) have been established to clarify whether central bank
operations are meant to maintain the prevailing policy stance in the face
of shocks or whether a change in policy orientation is intended. The
coexistence of several conventions would prove confusing. Appropriate
actions on the part of the System, together with market trading and
arbitrage, would eventually bring about the desired liquidity stance, but
this process could give rise to misunderstandings, undesired volatility in
interest rates, and other inefficiencies in the management of liquidity
conditions. Once again, while this argument also suggests that harmo-
nization would be desirable, it does not help to determine its specific
terms.
These arguments suggest that a close harmonization of monetary
policy instruments and procedures would be desirable in order to allow
the European System of Central Banks to signal its policy intentions
efficiently, and it would be necessary to avoid major shifts in the location
of financial activities. Nevertheless, this line of reasoning only points to
the benefits of harmonization on its own merits and leaves the terms of
harmonization indeterminate.
Instruments and decentralization. Two final key issues need to be
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policy: the choice of instruments (reserve requirements, standing facil-
ities, and open market operations) and the degree to which policy
execution can be delegated to national central banks.
Regarding the choice of instruments, as mentioned earlier, over the
past years open market operations have generally become the main
channel through which monetary conditions are influenced in European
countries, and money market interest rates the principal operational
target in the daily conduct of national monetary policies. Nevertheless,
significant differences still exist in the use made by countries of two
other channels for regulating liquidity conditions: reserve requirements
and standing facilities. Thus, what should be the importance of these
two instruments vis-a-vis open market operations in the execution of the
single monetary policy is an important question.
The Statute of the European System of Central Banks contemplates
the use of reserve requirements in the European Monetary Union, since it
states that "the European Central Banks may require credit institutions
established in Member States to hold minimum reserves on accounts
with the European Central Bank and national central banks in pursu-
ance of monetary policy objectives" (Article 19.1).
As is well known, reserve requirements are not necessary to control
the evolution of monetary variables in the European Monetary Union,
since this can be achieved through open market operations. Further-
more, when not fully remunerated, reserve requirements may encour-
age socially suboptimal financial behavior, since they constitute a
distortionary tax on banking activities that drives a wedge between
deposit and lending rates. Where reserve requirements could be useful
is in facilitating the management of the money market (see Hardy 1993).
In particular, when executed with averaging provisions, reserve require-
ments allow the banking system to "cope with temporary liquidity
shortages or surpluses in the market without central bank intervention"
(Committee of Governors 1993). This is found useful now by many
central banks, because it gives them the freedom to choose how
frequently they should be in the market to steer money market interest
rates in the appropriate direction.
In principle, reserve requirements could be set in the European
Monetary Union so that they facilitate money market management
without creating excessive distortions on financial behavior. Specifically,
a uniform zero average reserve requirement in the Union would
accomplish these goals, provided banks find it costly not to meet the
requirement and provided a large enough overdraft facility is available
at the central bank.
Another potential instrument at the disposal of the System for use
in regulating liquidity conditions are standing facilities. These are offered
on a bilateral basis by the central bank to specific financial institutions to
cushion their liquidity shortages or surpluses. In general, these facilities178 Charles A.E. Goodhart and Josd Vi~ials
play a role similar to that of reserve requirements; that is, to stabilize
money market conditions and to lower the volatility of short-term
interest rates. Thus, in this regard, their usefulness is to some extent
contingent on the specific arrangements made regarding reserve re-
quirements. In addition to the above, the pre-announced rates at which
standing facilities are offered can be used--as is the case now in several
European countries--to signal changes in the policy intentions of the
monetary authorities. It is not obvious, however, why this latter function
could not be exercised instead through open market operations.
Open market operations are the third instrument available to the
System to execute the single monetary policy. Well-known efficiency
reasons favor open market operations playing a central role in the
execution of a single monetary policy, even though a number of
important decisions will have to be made regarding the nature and
frequency of operation, the eligible underlying assets, the number of
counterparties, and the auction procedures.
Also to be considered is the potential role of open market operations
vis-a-vis those of reserve requirements and standing facilities in the
execution of future monetary policy. In practice, the choice of instru-
ments should be made on grounds of economic and operational effi-
ciency and, once a specific decision has been taken, the selected
instruments should be varied over time to achieve the desired objec-
tives. In the case of the European Monetary Union, however, the initial
diversity of national monetary instruments and procedures and the
provisions in the Statute are likely to imply that the centrally decided
single monetary policy will be executed in a rather decentralized way, at
least in the early years.
If, as seems likely, the issue of decentralization plays an important
role in deciding how to execute future monetary policy, this could be
crucial in determining the relative importance of the various instru-
ments. The reason is that the management of both reserve requirements
and standing facilities can be decentralized to a much greater extent than
open market operations. On the one hand, provided reserve require-
ments are the same throughout the Union, management of this instru-
ment can be delegated to national central banks without difficulty. In
turn, since reserve requirements permit a lower frequency of interven-
tion of central banks in the money market, this makes it easier to
decentralize the execution of the single monetary policy.
Similarly, the decentralization of s~anding facilities has some oper-
ational advantages and would not seem difficult to reconcile with an
overall control of central bank money injected or withdrawn through
this channel. The European Central Bank would be relieved from the
burden of maintaining accounts with all banks operating in the Union,
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national central banks have accumulated over the years would be better
exploited.
In contrast to the above, the decentralized execution of open market
operations is much more difficult to contemplate in practice. Indeed, as
with foreign exchange operations, open market operations must be
executed in a timely and flexible fashion to offset liquidity shocks. This
suggests that such operations should be carried out in a centralized
fashion, with their monetary effects nonetheless being uniformly spread
through the Union.
To conclude, although complex technical issues are involved in
comparing the merits of alternative models for the execution of future
monetary policy, it is not unreasonable to expect that an evolutionary
model will be chosen which, starting from a relatively higher degree of
decentralization, can evolve over time towards a more centralized
system. While open market operations are likely to be the main
instrument for regulating liquidity conditions, as is now the case in most
European countries, reserve requirements cum standing facilities could
play a more important role in the early, rather than the later, stages of
economic and monetary union.
Conclusions
This paper has examined a number of issues regarding recent
developments in the formulation and implementation of monetary
policy, with a strong, although not exclusive, European focus. In
particular, it has concentrated, on the one hand, on describing recent
constitutional changes as regards the objectives of monetary policy and
the degree of political and functional autonomy of central banks; and, on
the other, on exploring several key strategic and tactical questions
concerning the implementation of monetary policy. While these issues
are of importance in many countries, they are crucial in the European
Union, where major changes in monetary policy are envisaged to take
place following the establishment of European Monetary Union.
Admittedly, the paper has been primarily taxonomic and descrip-
tive. This is, in large part, because the constitutional changes involved,
more autonomous central banks and European Monetary Union, are
either very recent or still ongoing. So there is, as yet, little room for
econometric testing, insofar as that is ever possible, of whether such
changes have improved the conduct of policy.
Some concerns have been voiced about whether similar changes
have made policies in New Zealand and Canada too deflationary,
initially. Yet it is remarkable how well the inflation targets in those
countries, and in the United Kingdom, have so far been met. Skeptics
would counter that neighboring countries without such direct inflation180 Charles A.E. Goodhart and Jos~ Vi~ials
targets, for example, Australia and the United States, have done broadly
as well on this front.
So the jury is still out. Nevertheless, a strong ground swell of
support continues for moving both to more autonomous central banks
and, within the European Union, to European Monetary Union. The
case for such autonomy is greatly enhanced if it is accepted that central
banks have a single medium-term objective, price stability. Such an
objective facilitates delegation and enhances accountability.
This notwithstanding, it must be acknowledged that the economi-
cally beneficial effects of clarifying the objectives of monetary policy and
granting greater central bank autonomy will be all the greater, if fiscal
policy is not at odds with monetary policy. Indeed, as established by
economic principles and confirmed by experience, the anti-inflationary
credibility of monetary policy depends not only on the autonomy of the
central bank but also on the coherence and credibility of overall
macroeconomic policy. For this reason, it is of fundamental importance
that the policies of both the autonomous central banks and the fiscal
authorities be closely coordinated, toward the pursuit of the overall goal
of sustained, non-inflationary growth. Finally, judging by experience,
the favorable impact of improvements in national monetary institutions
has tended to be greater when such institutional changes have reflected
society’s concern about inflation and its awareness that high inflation is
not conducive--but is actually detrimental--to economic growth.
Also discussed at some length are the alternatives between having
as the primary target a direct inflation objective or an intermediate
(monetary) target. We would not, however, want to leave the impres-
sion that the alternatives are either sharp or mutually exclusive. Indeed,
any country pursuing a quantified objective will keep a close eye on a
range of intermediate information variables: Any country choosing an
intermediate target will be greatly concerned about the (time-varying)
relationships between that target and the outcome for the final (infla-
tion) objective.
Finally, we would like to mention that recent constitutional changes
may increase flexibility concerning the adoption of specific monetary
policy strategies and tactics, by providing a more solid and transparent
medium-term framework for monetary policy where price stability is
clearly established as its primary objective and where the ability of
central banks to pursue this objective without political interference is
enhanced. As has been pointed out recently (Crockett 1993), this new
institutional framework could provide a useful synthesis between rules
and discretion, and this could reinforce the medium-term, anti-inflation-
ary credibility of monetary policy while allowing for the appropriate
degree of flexibility in the shorter-term setting of targets and instru-
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Appendix Table 1
Institutional Features of Central Banks in the European Union
National Bank of Danmarks National Deutsche
Item Belgium Bank Bundesbank
Princil~al Statutory None, although To maintain a safe To safeguard the
Objective safeguarding the and secure currency
currency implicit currency system
Legal Authority for:
1. Exchange Rate Regime 1. Government 1. Government
2. Setting targets for 2. Central Bank 2. dentral Bank (no
monetary growth (no target set target set at
at present) present)
3. Changing key interest rates 3. Central Bank 3. Central Bank
Responsibilities:
1. Execution of monetary 1, Yes 1. Yes
and exchange rate policy
2. Issuance of currency 2. Yes 2. Yes
3. Payment system services 3. Yes 3. Yes
4. Bank of banks and 4. Yes 4. Yes
government
5. Supervision of financial 5. No 5. No
institutions
6. Safeguard financial stability 6. Yes 6. Yes
7. Official reserve 7. Yes 7. Yes
management
Governing Bodies -Governor -Board of Governors
-Board of Directors -Board of Directors
-Council of -Committee of
Regency Directors

















Appointment of -Crown on -Crown on
Governor by: proposal proposal
of the of the
Government Government
Term: -5 years -No fixed term
(renewable)
Recent and/or Since March 1993, None
Planned Changes abolition of the
previous. "power of
suspension and
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Appendix Table 1 (continued)
Institutional Features of Central Banks in the European Union
Bank of Banco de Banque de
Item Greece Espaf~a France
Principal Statutory To control currency To achieve price To assure price
Objective in circulation and stability stability
credit
Legal Authority for:
1. Exchange Rate 1. Government 1. Government 1. Government
Regime
2, Setting targets for 2. Central Bank 2. Central Bank 2. Central Bank
monetary growth
3. Changing key 3. Central Bank 3. Central Bank 3, Central Bank
interest rates
Responsibilities:
1. Execution of monetary 1, Yes 1, Yes 1. Yes
and exchange rate
policy
2. Issuance of currency 2. Yes 2. Yes 2. Yes
3. Payment system 3. Yes 3. Yes 3, Yes
services
4. Bank of banks and 4. Yes 4, Yes 4. Yes
government
5, Supervision of 5, Yes 5. Yes 5. Yes
financial institutions
6. Safeguard financial 6, Yes 6. Yes 6. Yes
stability
7. Official reserve 7. Yes 7. Yes 7. Yes
management






Appointment of -Government -Crown on proposal -Council of
Governor by: on proposal of of President of Ministers
General Council Government
Term: ~ years (renewable) ~ years (non- -6 years
renewable) (renewable)
Recent and/or Consideration of      Autonomy Law Law introducing all the
Planned Changes proposals to increase of 1 June 1994, provisions of the
the independence of introducing all Maastricht Treaty
the central bank in the provisions relating to central banks
the future and to of the Maastricht Treaty enacted in December
make the Statute relating to central banks 1993
more compatible
with the Maastricht
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Appendix Table 1 (continued)
Institutional Features of Central Banks in the European Union
Institut
Central Bank Monetaire
Item of Ireland Banca d’ltalia Luxembourgeois
Principal Statutory To safegard integrity. None, although To promote the
Objective of the currency safeguarding the stability of the
currency implicit currency
Legal Authority for:
1. Exchange Rate 1. Government 1. Government 1. Government Regime
2. Setting targets for 2. Central bank 2. Joint with Government 2. Not applicable
monetary growth (no target
set at present)
3. Changing key interest 3. Central Bank 3. Central Bank 3. Not applicable
rates
Responsibilities:
1. Execution of monetary
and exchange rate
policy
2. Issuance of currency
3, Payment system
services














1. Yes 1, Yes 1, Yes (partly)
2, Yes 2. Yes 2. Yes
3. Yes 3. Yes 3. No
4. Yes 4, Yes 4, No
5. Yes 5. Yes 5. Yes
6. Yes 6. Yes 6. Yes
7, Yes 7, Yes (together with the 7. Yes
Italian Exchange
Office)




President on Board of Directors with
~roposal of approval of Government
overnment








Prospective bill to ~Since November 1993, -A draft bill to effect
suppress the power the Bank has had the the changes in
of the Government to power to set the legislation required
be consulted by the compulsory reserve by the Maastricht
Bank regarding the ratio Treaty is in
latter’s general -Other institutional preparation at the
function and duty. changes required to IML
Other institutional fulfill the Maastricht
changes are now . Treaty are under
under discussion examination184 Charles A.E. Goodhart and Jos~ Vi~als
Appendix Table 1 (continued)
Institutional Features of Central Banks in the European Union
Nederlandsche Banco de Bank of
Item Bank Portugal England
Principal Statutory To safeguard the To maintain internal None, although
Objective value of the monetary stability and safeguarding the
currency the external solvency currency implicit
of currency
Legal Authority for:
1. Exchange Rate Regime 1. Government 1. Government 1. Government
2. Setting targets for 2. Central Bank (no 2. Central Bank (no 2. Government
monetary growth target set at target set at present)
present)
3. Changing key interest 3. Central Bank 3. Central Bank 3. Joint with
rates                                                               Government
Responsibilities:
1. Execution of monetary 1. Yes 1. Yes
and exchange rate policy
2. Issuance of currency 2. Yes 2. Yes
3. Payment system services 3. Yes 3. Yes
4. Bank of banks and 4. Yes 4. Yes
government
5. Supervision of financial 5. Yes 5. Yes
institutions
6. Safeguard financial 6. Yes 6. Yes
stability
7. Official reserve 7. Yes 7. Yes
management












7. Yes (as agent for
the Government)
Appointment of Nominated by joint -Council of Ministers on









Term: -7 years (renewable) -5 years (renewable) -5 years
(renewable)
Recent and/or Amendment to prohibit None. Changes will
Planned Changes the underwriting of be needed if U.K.
. Treasury Bills. participates in
Institutional changes Stage Three
required to fulfill the
Maastricht Treaty
currently discussed
Note: All the national legislations that so required were changed in 1993 to be consistent with the
Maastricht Treaty prohibition of public sector financing by the central bank.
Source: Annual Report of the Committee of Governors of European Central Banks 1993, central bank
reports, and recent legislative proposals and laws.STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF MONETARY POLICY 185
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Charles Goodhart and Jos~ Vif~als have written a comprehensive
and informative paper on central bank independence and the pursuit of
price stability as the prime target of monetary policy, covering both
recent developments and the arguments surrounding them. They typ-
ically exercise good judgment in their preferences among the argu-
ments, or remain agnostic. But taken as a whole the paper left me
distinctly uncomfortable, more for what it does not say than for what it
does. I will try to explain why, under four headings.
Limited Coverage of the Study
First, it is a pity that the authors’ coverage is limited to Europe with
a few side comments on other countries, and in particular that they did
not include Japan and the United States in their discussion. Had they
done so, they would have discovered in the United States an indepen-
dent central bank without quantitative targets (I do not count the
obligation to report under Humphrey-Hawkins as serious targets) or
even a primary objective, yet with a record of performance that is not
obviously worse than that of most European countries; and they would
have discovered in Japan a central bank subservient to the Ministry of
Finance with an outstanding recent record measured by the consumer
price index. These two examples suggest that the generality of some of
their conclusions is not warranted: for example, the close link between
independence and a primary target, or between independence and good
anti-inflation performance.
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They also fail to include developing countries except for an occa-
sional reference. To include them would have led to much greater skepti-
cism regarding intermediate monetary targets and, indeed, might have led
them to question the desirability of the primacy of price stability as the
objective of monetary policy, a point to which I return below.
On the first point, part of the process of development is evolution
of the financial system and increasing monetization of the economy, that
is, a downward trend in velocity on any given conventional measure of
the money supply, but on paths that are not always regular or easily
predictable. One recent study of developing countries has shown that
against this downward trend, annual velocity actually increased by
more than 5 percent--a substantial increase--20 percent of the time;
some velocity increases clearly were associated with identifiable external
supply shocks such as the two major increases in world oil prices (1974
and 1979-80), but the origins of many increases were not so readily
identifiable or predictable (see Little and others 1993, pp. 328-32).
On the second point, moderate inflation in a country with poorly
developed financial and tax institutions may be not only a very effective
source of seigniorage revenue through the "inflation tax" on money
balances, but also a relatively efficient tax, in the sense of giving rise to
fewer distortions than alternative sources of revenue’and reaching
parts of the population otherwise difficult to tax. That fact makes the
currency board experiments in Argentina and Estonia all the more
remarkable, but they must be understood in the context of establishing
a credible change in monetary regime rather than optimal management
of a given monetary regime. Goodhart and Vif~als might also have
mentioned that Colombia in 1991 adopted an independent central bank,
in that it cannot be instructed by the government (although the minister
of finance chairs the independent monetary board, as he did in the early
days of the U.S. Federal Reserve System) and it cannot lend to the
government.
Price Stability as a Primary Target
My second unease about the Goodhart and Vihals paper is its
implicit and uncritical acceptance of price stability as the primary
objective of central bank action, with little discussion of when this target
should be overridden (for example, in their brief discussion about
whether to target the price level or the rate of inflation, or in their brief
allusion to the possible need for modification in the presence of large
supply shocks--possible modifications that incidentally greatly cloud
the lack of ambiguity they prize for establishing accountability). In
particular, they devote too little attention to assuring the smooth
functioning of the financial system. All modern economies rest on an190 Richard N. Cooper
extensive network of credit, and this network in some respects is a
house of cards, resting on diverse expectations and on confidence by
each agent in continuity. The financial system is therefore vulnerable to
unexpected, large real or financial shocks. A lender of last resort is
required to underpin the system. But to function properly, a lender of
last resort for prudential reasons should also have some supervisory
role--or very close liaison with those who have that responsibility--over
the institutions with potential access to the lender of last resort.
Moreover, Goodhart and Vif~als fail to consider the economic role
that changes in price levels sometimes play in modern economies, for
example in introducing a degree of real wage flexibility when for many
reasons nominal wages are difficult to reduce. In the context of countries
attempting to integrate, and therefore attempting to fix their exchange
rates, national movements in price levels may be an essential element in
adjusting to regional shocks. Concretely, unification of Germany on the
terms on which it occurred called for a relative rise in prices in Germany
relative to its neighbors. If, for whatever reason, the deutsche mark was
not allowed to appreciate, attempting to prevent the German price level
from rising relative to that of its major trading partners would then have
thwarted an important mechanism of adjustment.
Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Third, without developing the point, Goodhart and Vitals seem to
accept the conventional European wisdom that having price stability as
the prime objective for central banks will require close coordination of
fiscal policy as well. This proposition has generated extensive discussion
inappropriate to rehearse here, except to record my view that it would
be undesirable to have too close coordination (through rules) of fiscal
policy in a monetary union. More to the point of the paper, if price
stability is to become the prime objective of governments, as a call for
close coordination of monetary and fiscal policies suggests, it leaves the
reader puzzled about why the independence of central banks is so
important. But if price stability is not to be the primary objective of
macroeconomic policy, why should fiscal policy be coordinated with
monetary policy, as distinguished from taking into account the central
bank’s likely actions in pursuit of its primary objective, price stability?
Political Accountability of the Central Bank
Finally, the authors suggest that the arrangements in the Maastricht
Treaty for the forthcoming European System of Central Banks are
modeled on the German Bundesbank, and indeed are necessary in theDISCUSSION 191
interests of central bank independence and pursuit of price stability after
the formation of the Economic and Monetary Union. I strongly disagree
with this formulation. It plays on an ambiguity in the word "indepen-
dence." The German Bundesbank and the U.S. Federal Reserve System
are independent of government in a meaningful sense of that term, one
that contrasts with central banks, for example, in Britain, Japan, and
France until recently. But they are not independent of the political
process. The Maastricht Treaty comes as close as it can to making the
European System of Central Banks independent of the political process,
and that in my view is highly undesirable.
The central tenet of democratic government, the ultimate basis for
its legitimacy, is accountability to the public by all officials who make
policy decisions affecting public welfare. Democracies differ greatly in
their detailed institutional arrangements for providing accountability,
but all share that fundamental principle.
The Maastricht Treaty fails to satisfy this fundamental principle. It
creates a body of Platonic monetary guardians, accountable to no one, to
frame and execute one of the most important aspects of policy in
modern economies, affecting tens or even hundreds of millions of
people. This was done in the name of insulating monetary policy, and
its primary objective of price stability, from political pressure, of
endowing the new European central bank with political independence,
as the German Bundesbank apparently has.
But Maastricht has taken the notion of central bank independence
much too far. It is true that the central banks of Germany and the United
States are independent of the sitting government, in that they cannot be
given orders with respect to monetary policy. In particular, they cannot
be required to finance government deficits. But they are certainly not
independent of the political process in those countries, as any of their
central bankers would testify. Both are created by simple statute, and a
change in the statute could sweep away the independence. That is not
so easy to accomplish under the separation of powers in the United
States: Both houses of the Congress as well as the President would have
to agree. Even so, members of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System pay close attention to congressional sentiment, al-
though they rarely yield to it.
Under Germany’s parliamentary system, a Chancellor who felt
thwarted by the Bundesbank could, with his parliamentary majority,
simply change the central bank statute. Any Chancellor that tried to do
so in recent years, however, would find himself fighting for his political
life. It is laudatory German public opinion, not formal legal devices; that
protects the independence of the Bundesbank. That is as it should be in
a democratic society, the essence of which is full accountability of
government to the general public.192 Richard N. Cooper
Being embedded in the political process, even though independent
of the sitting government, creates invisible but effective limits to the
arbitrary exercise of power by these independent central banks; protect-
ing their independence requires that their actions continue to command
support, even if only grumbling support, by a majority of the public.
And members of the governing bodies of these central banks are
conscious of that important condition.
The Maastricht treaty ignores this fundamental point. Once the
European Monetary Union is in place, only revision of the treaty,
requiring ratification by all member country parliaments, could alter the
decisions of the European System of Central Banks.
How could the European System of Central Banks be made politi-
cally accountable, yet retain its operating independence for monetary
policy? One approach would be to give additional powers to the
European Parliament to alter the statute of the European Central Bank;
that is, by analogy with independent national central banks, make the
statute subject to legislation (perhaps by special majority), rather than
the much more arduous (and unanimous) process of treaty amendment.
But that would imply a strong move toward a federal Europe, which
Europeans do not seem ready to commit to now.
An alternative would be to permit the European Council by special
majority to override actions by the European System of Central Banks,
but only after debate in national parliaments. Alternatively, the Euro-
pean Parliament could be designated as the venue for the debate. The
analogy here is the arrangement in the Netherlands, whereby in the
final analysis the Minister of Finance can dictate policy to the Dutch
central bank, but the Governor of the bank can insist on a parliamentary
debate on the override.
Or the two possibilities could be combined, with the European
Parliament having authority to initiate a change in the statute of the
European System of Central Banks, but the change taking effect only
with the approval of the European Council. Any of these arrangements
would provide some measure of accountability, and would put the
European System of Central Banks on notice that its actions must remain
within the bounds of public acceptability.
Why did Maastricht go as far as it did to assure a very strong form
of central bank independence and the primacy of price stability? The
answer partly reflects the strong and sometimes helpful working hy-
pothesis of the economics profession that, in the medium to long run,
money supplies affect only price levels, not the real side of economies,
so that central bank actions can only influence prices in the long run.
This working hypothesis through repetition and use has come to be
accepted as fact, as a structural characteristic of actual economies. It is a
dangerous assumption, largely because it is rarely questioned. TheDISCUSSION 193
evidence is ample that it is false in a short run that runs for several years.
The best that can be said about the empirical evidence over longer
periods is that with sufficient imagination by the estimators, the hypoth-
esis cannot be rejected--a very weak test on which to base important
policy decisions.
An alternative interpretation that has come into favor among central
bankers is that price stability facilitates increases in real income. That
does not stand close empirical inspection, either. Successful attempts to
find that inflation is costly in terms of growth in total output or in
productivity derive their power from a few outlying observations. In
cross-section analysis, Argentina plays this role. It is not difficult to
agree that high rates of inflation--several hundred percent a year or
more--are disruptive of society, including resource allocation in the
economy. But that observation hardly applies, without independent
supporting evidence, to differences between 4 and 2 percent a year; or
between 2 and zero percent. In time series analysis, the two oil shocks
play the role of the outliers, depressing output and raising prices at the
same time. Big supply shocks indeed pose serious problems for macro-
economic management, but targeting price stability will not help solve
those problems. And generalizations from such events should not be
applied to other periods.
The other answer as to why Maastricht contains the provisions it
does of course lies in a deep dissatisfaction with inflation in the 1970s
and early 1980s, and a desire to ensure that the new European central
bank can pursue a policy of price stability without political interference.
That may be a legitimate reflection of the preferences of today’s
Europeans, and certainly of their political leaders. But that expression of
preference should be subject to public review from time to time, since
both people and circumstances change over time. In particular, an
overwhelming preoccupation of European leaders with inflation today
has the flavor of a general staff planning its force structure and
operational doctrine to fight the last war. Inflation is not likely to be the
principal problem of the world, or the European, economy during the
next decade. On the contrary, the next decade may well be dominated
by deflationary tendencies, owing to weak balance sheets in Japan and
Europe, and residually in the United States, and to the extreme caution
in lenders that events of the past five years have engendered. And, not
least, to the deflationary convergence requirements of the Maastricht
Treaty itself.
In my view, Maastricht would increase the democratic gap in the
Community beyond the point of tolerability. Some modification of the
arrangements for political accountability are almost certain to be made
before the European Monetary Union comes into existence. Whether
such modification marks a further step toward a unified Europe,194 Richard N. Cooper
achieving accountability by enlarging the powers of the European
Parliament, or whether it reverts to a community of nations, by giving
the Council of Ministers some political override on the European System
of Central Banks’ decisions, is the critical question that Europeans must
decide in the coming years.
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